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Agency Budgets, Cost Information, and Auditing* 
Jeffrey S. Banks, University of Rochester 
A model of legislature-agency interaction is analyzed where the agency possesses an in-
formational advantage in that only it knows the cost of its services. The legislature has the abil-
ity to audit the agency, where auditing is a costly means of verifying the agency's information. 
Two different procedures are analyzed for determining the agency's budget: in one, the agency 
makes a budget request, after which the legislature can either accept or reject the request, or 
audit the agency and impose a budget equal to the true cost of services. In the other procedure, 
the legislature can follow a request with a counterproposal to the agency, which can then either 
accept or reject. Since under both procedures auditing is costly, it will be optimal for the leg-
islature to refrain from auditing a request if the perceived benefits do not outweigh this cost. 
At issue is the ability of the legislature to impose discipline on the agency's request and final 
budget through an optimal choice of audit and counterproposal strategies, the extent of the 
information transmitted through the agency's budget request, and the efficiency of the resulting 
outcomes. A refinement of the sequential equilibrium concept provides the behavioral predic-
tions for the procedures. 
Introduction 
A key ingredient in the determination of governmental policies is the 
interaction between legislatures and executive agencies. We can think of an 
agency as being responsible for one "dimension" of a larger policy space that 
describes the legislature's choice set, where the responsibilities of an agency 
on its dimension include providing information to, and carrying out the 
wishes of, the legislature. Hence, decisions by the legislature pertaining to 
an agency's budget have a fundamental impact on the nature and scope of 
the government's output, since the budget in effect defines those policies 
that are implementable by the agency. 
In his seminal work, Niskanen (1971) develops an economic model of 
the budgetary process in which the agency, being the sole provider of its par-
ticular "services," is able to use this monopoly power to bias decisions in 
its favor relative to the preferences of the legislature. A fundamental as-
sumption in Niskanen's model is that the relationship between legislature 
and agency is predicated on an asymmetry of information concerning pa-
rameters relevant to the policy choices and outcomes: the agency, due to 
"expertise" in its policy domain, possesses superior information concerning 
the costs and benefits of its services relative to the legislature. Thus the del-
*I would like to thank David Weimer, Barry Weingast, and three referees for valuable 
comments and suggestions. Financial support by the National Science Foundation through 
grant SES-8700468 is gratefully acknowledged. 
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AGENCY BUDGETS ANO AUDITING 
egation of authority to the agency in terms of budgetary decisions may lead 
to a more efficient outcome. The difficulties arise when, as is usually as-
sumed, the preferences of the legislature and the agency, and therefore their 
decision criteria, fail to coincide. Typical motives for the agency include 
budget maximization, security, and so forth, while the legislature considers 
distributional effects, costs versus benefits, and so on . Hence, from the leg-
islative point of view, any efficiency gains due to the delegation of authority 
to a better-informed agency are potentially mitigated by such a divergence 
of preferences. Furthermore, the legislature cannot simply ask the agency 
to reveal its information, for the divergence in preferences will typically im-
ply a willingness on the part of the agency to misrepresent the information. 
Given these difficulties, Niskanen ignores the issue of information transmis-
sion and acquisition and assumes rather that the agency is in complete con-
trol of budgetary "agenda," in essence reducing the analysis to that of a sin-
gle actor. 1 
Miller and Moe (1983) depart from this tradition by incorporating both 
parties as active participants, while maintaining the assumption that only the 
agency knows its cost of providing services. (See also Miller, 1977; Fiorina 
and Noll, 1978; and Spencer, 1980.) In the model the agency announces a 
supply schedule from which the legislature selects the quantity of services 
to be produced. Miller and Moe (1983) show that if the agency knows the 
legislature's demand for services it can have a considerable influence in de-
termining the final output, much as in Niskanen's earlier model. 
Given the sequence of events in Miller and Moe (1983), the actual cost 
of services is irrelevant to the legislature's decision, implying that the leg-
islature need not use resources in determining this cost. Yet this seems to 
neglect one of the legislature's primary responsibilities in its relationship 
with an agency, namely, that of oversight (e.g., McCubbins and Schwartz, 
1984). If an agency is differentially advantaging itself through its asymmetry 
of information, then it might benefit the legislature to exert some influence 
and/or to spend some resources in determining the agency's true cost of ser-
vices, thereby eliminating the source of the agency's advantage. The legis-
lature has at its disposal the ability to monitor the agency's actions, sub-
poena the agency's accountants, hold public or private hearings, and so 
forth, all for the purpose of acquiring information the agency may be un-
willing to reveal. Borrowing a phrase from the accounting and tax litera-
tures, we label this the legislature's ability to audit the agency. Such a strat-
egy is not without its cost to the legislature, however; adopting any of the 
above measures incurs some amount of resources. Thus, in general we can 
10ther "single actor" models, with one or the other party in control of the agenda , include 
those in Peltzman (1976), Stigler (1971) , and Wildavsky (1978). Weingast and Moran (1983) 
provide an excellent summary of the arguments for either party having control of the agenda. 
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think of auditing as summarizing the legislature's ability to verify the agen-
cy's information, where this verification imposes some positive cost on the 
legislature. 
Bendor, Taylor, and Van Gaalen (1987) develop a model with legisla-
tive auditing, where the legislature selects a schedule that describes the 
agency's budget as a function of its announced service cost as well as the true 
service cost, if the latter is uncovered through the legislature's investigative 
capabilities. The true service cost may be one of two values, and the agency, 
upon observing the budget schedule, decides which of the two values to re-
port. In choosing its budget schedule, the legislature attempts to give the 
agency the incentive to report truthfully, where this is in part accomplished 
by setting the "penalty budget," assessed if the agency is discovered report-
ing falsely, sufficiently low. A crucial assumption in this analysis is that the 
legislature has the ability to commit to a budget schedule which might not 
be ex post optimal, given the agency's announcement. In particular, the op-
timal penalty budget is such that, upon observing a misrepresentation by the 
agency, the legislature would prefer to impose some other budget than the 
penalty budget. 2 Yet ex ante the legislature prefers to make such a commit-
ment, since it generates a more "revealing" strategy on the part of the 
agency. 
This assumption of commitment is nontrivial; it allows the legislature 
both to threaten and to carry out actions that would not be in its interest 
ex post (i.e., actions which are not sequentially rational). Further, by select-
ing such actions prior to the agency's decision, the legislature is assured of 
relatively advantageous position vis-a-vis the situation without such commit-
ment. The rationale for such an assumption in Bendor, Taylor, and Van 
Gaalen (1987) rests with the notion that budgeting is actually a repeated 
game played by the legislature and agency and that the legislature has an 
incentive to establish a "reputation" for dealing harshly with a deceptive 
agency. Thus, "precommitting ... in a one-period model approximates 
what would emerge as [sequentially rational behavior] in a multiperiod 
model" (p. 815). While I concur that a multiperiod model is a better descrip-
tion of the reality of the budgetary process, I disagree that an initial attack 
on such a model should come about by assuming that the "reduced form" 
of a multiperiod game is essentially a one-period game with commitment. 
This in essence assumes a portion of that which is to be established in any 
sort of model, namely the behavior of the participants. Since the number 
of periods of any such interaction is endogenous, due to the "electoral con-
nection" of the legislature as well as whatever determines the decision cal-
2This "dynamic inconsistency" problem is common in the principal-agent literature and 
more generally in any model that allows one party to commit itself to future actions (see Kyd-
land and Prescott, 1977). 
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culus of agencies, it seems more appropriate to derive the sequentially ra-
tional behavior of the legislature and agency in ·a one-period model as a first 
step in analyzing the more dynamic setting of a multiperiod model. 3 This is 
the goal of the current paper. 
This paper analyzes a one-period model of the legislature-agency rela-
tionship in which the behavior of these parties is assumed to be sequentially 
rational; we also assume that the true cost of the agency's services can take 
on one of a continuum of values. Further, we analyze this situation under 
two different budgetary procedures, each of which describes the sequence 
of moves for the parties. In the closed procedure, the sequence is as follows: 
the agency, with knowledge of the cost of its services, makes a budget re-
quest to the legislature, which can either accept the budget request, thus 
agreeing to a monetary transfer of the requested amount in return for the 
agency's services, reject the request, in which case some "status quo" out-
come prevails, or audit the agency. I label this the closed procedure because 
of its similarity to the closed amendment procedure in Congress: the respon-
dent (e.g., the legislature, the floor of the House) does not possess the ability 
to propose its own alternative following that requested by the initiator (the 
agency, the committee). This analogy is not complete, though, given the 
presence of the auditing strategy for the legislature; if a budget request is 
audited, the legislature learns the true cost of the services and subsequently 
makes its accept/reject decision based on an exchange at a budget equal to 
the true cost.4 The open procedure, on the other hand, assumes that follow-
ing a requested budget the legislature can accept, reject, audit, or make a 
counterproposal to the agency, which the agency can then either accept or 
reject; if the counterproposal is rejected, no exchange takes place. 
At issue in each procedure is the degree to which the agency's budgetary 
agenda control is moderated by the ability of the legislature to verify the true 
cost of the agency's services. Of particular interest is whether or not the be-
havior of the legislature will provide incentives for the agency to request 
lower budgets when its true cost of services is low, as is done in Bendor, Tay-
lor, and Van Gaalen (1987). Contrary to their analysis, however, the leg-
islature in the current model is unable to commit ex ante to an auditing 
schedule (and a budget schedule under the open procedure) to provide such 
incentives. The equilibrium concept used to analyze the model requires that 
the legislature's decision to audit be optimal, given the legislature's beliefs 
about the true cost of services. If auditing were costless, then it would be 
30bviously the one-period model is a special case of a multiperiod model. 
4In a later section of the paper, I assume that this auditing is "imperfect," so that with 
some probability the true cost of services is not revealed; in such an instance the legislator 
makes the accept/reject decision based on the budget originally requested by the agency under 
the closed procedure. 
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sequentially rational for the legislature to audit a budget request irrespective 
of the amount, implying that the agency has no incentive to make its request 
a function of its true cost. However, if auditing is costly, as is assumed here, 
it may be optimal for the legislature to forgo an audit if the perceived ben-
efits of the audit were less than its cost , where this comparison depends on 
the budget requested under the closed procedure and the payoff from a 
counterproposal under the open. Furthermore, sequential rationality re-
quires that such a counterproposal by the legislature must be equal to that 
which maximizes its expected utility, given its beliefs about the cost of ser-
vices. 
The actual bargaining process from which an agency's budget is deter-
mined is undoubtedly much more complex than either of the procedures 
considered here. Yet these procedures seem to capture the notion of one 
or the other party being in control of the budgetary agenda and, as such, 
can provide insights into the behavior of the parties as a function of this con-
trol. In particular, we shall see how the ability of the legislature to make a 
counterproposal dramatically affects the incentives for the agency to 
"reveal" cost information through its budget request. 
The Basic Model and the Closed Procedure 
As with most models in this area, I equate the behavior and preferences 
of the legislature with that of a single representative legislator; similarly I 
model the agency as a unified actor. The interaction between the legislator, 
L, and the agency, A, is described as a bilateral monopoly, where L has an 
inelastic demand for one unit of A's services. The legislator places a (mon-
etary) value of v E (0, x) on the unit of services; thus , vis the maximum 
amount L would be willing to pay. The cost of one unit of services, c, is 
known to the agency, while the legislator initially treats c as a random vari-
able distributed with positive density f (-) on the interval [O, v]. 5 The se-
quence of moves under the closed procedure is as follows. The agency makes 
a budget request b E R to the legislator, who then has three options: (1) 
accept the budget request and hence acquire the services at a "price" of b; 
(2) reject the request, in which case no transaction occurs; or (3) audit the 
request at a cost of k > 0, which subsequently reveals the true cost of ser-
vices, and then decide whether or not to acquire the services at a price equal 
to the cost c. 
5We ignore costs greater than v in deriving the equilibrium behavior of L and A, since L 
will never agree to a budget b > v , and feasibility requires that b > c. In describing changes 
in equilibrium behavior from changes in v, we can think of the prior f ( ·) as being defined on 
the interval [O, c], where c > v, so that an increase in v will increase the relevant range of service 
costs. 
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We model this situation as a game of incomplete information (Harsanyi, 
1967-68), where a fictitious player, "Nature," selects the cost of services ac-
cording to the probability schedule f ( ·) and where only the agency observes 
this selection. Since A can make its requested budget contingent on the ob-
served cost, a budget strategy for A is a function 13 : [O, v] --;. R, where 
b = 13(c) is the budget request of A if the cost of services is c. Since by as-
sumption A has no other sources of exchange or financing, we restrict the 
set of available budgets to those that render production of the agency's ser-
vices feasible, so that for all c, 13(c) ~ c. 6 A strategy for the legislator L 
will consist of an initial decision to accept, reject, or audit a request and, 
conditional on auditing, a decision to accept or reject as a function of the 
true cost. Define an audit strategy for L as a pair of functions 
a : R --;. Li2, 
-y: R--;.Li1, 
where iii is the i-dimensional unit simplex. Let a(b) (a1(b), a2 
(b)), where a 1(b) is the probability L accepts a request of b; a2(b) is the prob-
ability L audits; and 1 - a 1(b) - a2(b) is the probability L rejects. Sim-
ilarly let -y(c) be the probability that L acquires the services following an au-
dit which reveals the cost to be c. 
Initially we assume that both parties are risk neutral, so that their pay-
offs can be specified as follows: if a budget request of b is accepted by L, 
then L receives v - b andA receives b; ifthe request is rejected both receive 
a payoff of O; if a request is audited and subsequently accepted L receives 
v - c - k and A receives c; finally if a request is audited and rejected 
L receives - k and A receives 0. Thus the preferences of the agency are 
Niskanen-like in that A attempts to maximize the budget of the agency. 7 
For the agency, the expected utility from requesting a budget of b, given 
true cost c and auditing strategy a, 'Y by the legislator is 
EUA(b, c; a, -y) ~ a1(b) · b + a2(b) · -y(c) · c. 
The expected utility for the legislator associated with some auditing strategy 
will in general depend on the beliefs L possesses concerning the true cost 
of services. Let µ( · I b) denote L's beliefs about the value of c upon observ-
ing a request of b; then L's expected utility from adopting the audit strategy 
a, -y, conditional on observing a request of b, is 
6 An alternative specification would be to have services be provided for budgets less than 
cost, but at a lower "quality." This would not change any of the results under the closed pro-
cedure; a discussion of the effect under the open procedure is in note 17 below. 
7 Alternatively, A could be interested in maximizing the budget surplus b - c; however, 
such a change would not alter the equilibrium predictions. 
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EUIJb, a, -y; µ) = a 1(b) · (v - b) 
+ a1(b) · [J -y(c)(v - c)µ(c I b)dc - k]. 
This situation is one in which there are gains from the exchange of the 
agency's services to the legislator. The relevant prices (i.e., budgets) at 
which an exchange can profitably take place are those in the interval [ c, v], 
where the price determines the gains from the exchange to each party (ig-
noring auditing costs). The preferences of the parties are diametrically op-
posed, in that the agency prefers higher prices to lower, while the legislator 
prefers lower to higher. Both however realize that an exchange at some price 
in [ c, v] is preferred to no exchange at all. Thus if no exchange takes place, 
an inefficient outcome will occur. The legislator also has the ability to im-
pose a price equal to c by incurring the audit cost k. Yet k > 0 implies that 
any such auditing leads to an inefficient outcome as well, since a price equal 
to the true service cost could have been agreed to without an audit. The goal 
then is to determine when an exchange will take place and at what price and 
whether or not the legislator will resort to an audit. 
Equilibrium Behavior 
As with most rational choice models, we examine this interaction be-
tween legislator and agency through an equilibrium analysis; that is, our con-
clusions about the model are derived from properties of the behavior of the 
participants when each is acting optimally, given the other's actions. The 
equilibrium concept we employ to analyze this model is a refinement of the 
sequential equilibrium concept (Kreps and Wilson, 1982). Briefly, a sequen-
tial equilibrium consists of a budget strategy [3* for the agency that is optimal 
given the audit strategy a*, -y* of the legislator, where -y* is optimal given 
any realized cost c, and where a* is optimal according to the beliefsµ* the 
legislator possesses concernieg the true cost of services. Further, these be-
liefs satisfy Bayes's Rule, given the budget strategy [3* and the prior belief 
f(·). This last condition implies that, if the budget b' is requested by the 
agency only if the cost of services is c', then upon observing b' the legislator 
should assign probability 1 to the true cost being equal to c'. If, on the other 
hand, a subset of costs would imply a request of b', then L should place pos-
itive probability only on these types and to the degree dictated by the prior 
f(·). 
The sequential equilibrium concept requires the legislator's decision to 
accept or reject an exchange following an audit to be "sequentially ration-
al," so that in any equilibrium -y must satisfy -y(c) = 1, for all c ~ v. Thus 
the legislator cannot "threaten" to forgo an exchange, as is allowed under 
the Nash equilibrium concept. Hence, given the risk neutrality of the leg-
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islator, we can without loss of generality redefine the expected payoffs of 
the parties as: 
EUA(b, c; a) = a 1(b) · b + a2(b) · c 
EUL(b, a; µ) = a1(b) · (v - b) + a2(b) · [v - Cµ - k], 
where 
cµ =Jc· µ(c I b)dc 
is the expected value of c, according to the probability µ( · ). 
Sequential rationality at the legislator's initial decision requires that if 
b > v then a 1(b) = 0, while if b < v a 1(b) + a 2(b) = 1, so that L 
will never accept a budget request greater than v and never reject a request 
less than v. Further, a 1(b) = 1 for all b ~ k, since for any beliefs con-
cerning the true cost of services, the legislator would attain a higher payoff 
by accepting rather than auditing. Taken together, these restrictions imply 
that in any equilibrium 13(c) E [min{c, k}, v] for all c. 
Not surprisingly, the equilibrium behavior of the agency and legislator 
is a function of the audit cost k. If L observes a budget request of b < v, 
then acceptance of b generates a payoff to L of v - b, while auditing gen-
erates v - cµ - k, so that (after rearranging terms) L should accept b 
if b < cµ + k, and audit if b > cµ + k. If b = cµ + k, the legislator 
is indifferent between accepting and auditing and hence is able to random-
ize. Let k* solve 
J; c · f(c)dc I J; f(c)dc = v - k. (1) 
Thus, if k = k* the legislator is indifferent between accepting and auditing 
a budget of v requested by all c E [O, v]. For any k < k*, define c' as that 
cost which solves 
G(c', k, v) = Jv c · f(c)dc I Jv f(c)dc - v + k = 0, 
c' c' 
(2) 
so that if all c E [c', v] request a budget of v, Lis indifferent between ac-
cepting and auditing. For all k < k*, c' will exist and be such that 
c' + k < v. 
Our first result characterizes equilibrium strategies of the agency and 
legislator in which the cost of services is sometimes "revealed" through the 
agency's requested budget. 8 
80ne difficulty with the sequential equilibrium concept is that it allows for equilibria that 
are only supported by "implausible" beliefs at budgets requested with zero probability in equi-
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PROPOSITION 1: If k < k*, then the following constitute sequential equi-
librium strategies: 
*( ) _ {c + k if c E [O, c'J f3 c - v if c E (c', v] 
{
1 if b :S; k 
ai'(b) r.(b) if b E [k, c' + k] 
0 if b E (c' + k, v) 
s(v) if b = v 
a;(b) 1 - a~(b), 
where 
r(b) exp{(k - b)lk}, 
s(v) = r(c' + k) · kl(v - c'). 
Figure 1 visualizes these strategies. For costs c :S; c' the budget strategy is 
separating; each cost type requests a different budget. Thus when making 
the audit decision, the legislator knows precisely what the cost of the service 
will be. Further, the budget requested is such that Lis indifferent between 
accepting and auditing the budget, allowing L to randomize. Thus even 
though the true cost is revealed through the budget request strategy, L will 
proceed to audit the request with some probability. The probability sched-
ule r(b) is then chosen to give each cost type an incentive to request the 
(equilibrium) budget. Thus r(b) must satisfy ar!ab < 0, so that higher bud-
get requests are audited more often. Cost types c E (c', v] pool at the bud-
get b = v, so that upon observing a request of v the legislator is uncertain 
as to the true cost of services; L knows only that it is in the interval [ c', v]. 
Given the definition of c' in equation (2), the legislator is indifferent be-
tween accepting and auditing the budget, implying that again L can random-
ize. The probability of accepting b = vis then set so that all types c E (c', v] 
prefer to request b = v; in particular, given the continuity of A's utility, 
ai(v) will be such that c = c' will be exactly indifferent between separating 
at b = c' + k and pooling at b = v. 
librium. Further, since such "out-of-equilibrium" behavior non trivially affects the equilibrium 
predictions, this lack of restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs generates "unreasonable" 
equilibria. A number of authors have proposed restrictions on such beliefs (e.g., Cho and 
Kreps, 1987; Banks and Sobel, 1987; Grossman and Perry, 1986) in an attempt to limit attention 
to only those equilibria supported by "reasonable" beliefs. One of these refinements, that of 
"universal divinity" (Banks and Sobel, 1987), is employed here to select a unique equilibrium 
prediction. A rigorous definition of this concept and the proofs that the equilibria in Propo-
sitions 1 and 2 are the unique universally divine equilibria are contained in Appendix A. 
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Note that at a budget request of b = v, the legislator is also indifferent 
between accepting and rejecting the exchange. Thus one might think that 
there exist equilibria where L places positive probability on this option as 
well. As is shown in Appendix A, this will never constitute an equilibrium; 
the legislator will never reject an exchange if the budget b = vis requested. 
The effect of changes in the audit cost k and the value of services v on 
the equilibrium strategies described in Proposition 1 are fairly obvious: for 
c < c' , increasing k leads to an increase in the requested budget, while an 
increase in v has no effect. For c > c', an increase in k has no effect on 
the requested budget, while an increase in v increases the requested budget. 
Further, by equation (2) c' will be a function of k and v as well. As k in-
creases, c' decreases, so that an increase in audit cost implies that more cost 
FIGURE 1.A 
The Equilibrium Budget Strategy (k ,;:; k*) 
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k / 
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FIGURE 1.B 
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The Equilibrium Acceptance/ Auditing Strategy (k < k*) 
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types will pool at the budget request b = v and less will separate at 
b = c + k. 9 The one result that cannot be determined without knowledge 
of the prior probability f ( ·) is the effect of changes in v on c'. For some dis-
tributions (e.g., uniform) ac'lav > 0, so that as v increases, more cost types 
separate; however, for other distributions, this sign is negative. In terms of 
the legislator's equilibrium auditing strategy, it is easily shown that for any 
requested budget the probability of auditing decreases as k increases, while 
a change in v has no effect. 
An interesting feature of this equilibrium is that for c < c' the legislator 
is at times agreeing to an exchange at a budget that is known to be above 
the service cost c; that is, the agency's strategy is such that the requested 
budget reveals the true cost and at a budget that is strictly greater than this 
cost. Hence, although the legislator is paying more than is required, Lis pro-
hibited under the closed procedure from making a counterproposal to the 
agency. In this way we see how the agency uses its agenda control to extract 
some of the gains from exchange from the legislator while simultaneously 
revealing its true service cost. The presence of the legislator's auditing strat-
egy mitigates this behavior, however, since cost types c < c' request bud-
gets that are strictly less than the "monopoly price" v. Hence, the legislator 
receives a portion of the gains from exchange as well. Later we shall see how 
these predictions are dramatically altered when the legislator has the ability 
to make a budgetary counterproposal. 
Let B(c; k, v) = EUA(c, 13*(c); a*(l3*(c))) denote the expected budget 
for the agency, given the equilibrium strategies 13*, a*, service cost c, and 
parameters k, v. For all cost types c < c', the expected budget is 
B(c; k, v) = c + k · exp{ -elk}. (3) 
Thus, aB/ac = 1 - exp{ - elk} > 0, so that the expected budget is in-
creasing in c. For cost types c > c', 
B(c; k, v) = c + exp{-c'lk} · k(v - c)l(v - c'), (4) 
so that aB/ac = 1 - exp{ - c' lk} · kl( v - c') > 0. Figure 2 graphs the 
equilibrium expected budget of the agency as a function of the cost of ser-
vices. From Figure 2 it is clear that the expected budget surplus, B 
(c; k, v) - c is a decreasing function of the service cost c. Hence, the larg-
est budget surplus occurs when the cost of services is at its lowest. 
The effect of changes in the parameters k, v, on the agency's expected 
budget are as follows: increasing the audit cost increases the agency's ex-
pected budget. For c E [O, c') the expected budget is invariant to changes 
9The result that ac'!ak < 0, as well as the effects of changes ink and v on B, V, and P 
are contained in Appendix A. 
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in v. For c E [ c', v] things are a little trickier. Suppose that ac' /av > O; then 
(as shown in Appendix A) there exists a cost c + E (c' , v) such that for 
c E [c', c + ) the expected budget is decreasing in v, while for c 
c E(c+, v] the expected budget is increasing in v. 
Next we turn to the expected utility for the legislator derived from the 
equilibrium strategies in Proposition 1: 
V(k, v) = J: EUd13*(c), a*(l3*(c)))J1c)dc. 
For cost types c E [c', v] the utility for the legislator is zero, since these 
types are requesting a budget of b == v, and L is indifferent between ac-
cepting and rejecting. For cost types c E [O, c'] the utility for the legislator 
is equal to v - c - k, since the requested budget is chosen to leave L 
indifferent. Thus the ex ante expected utility to L is equal to 
V(k, v) == J:' (v - c - k)J1c)dc. (5) 
FIGURE 2 
The Equilibrium Expected Budget (k < k* ) 
v 
/ 
k / 
/ 
45° 
c' v 
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Not surprisingly V decreases with an increase in the auditing cost k. 
When k increases, more cost types pool at b = v, thus depriving L of any 
positive payoff; further the budgets requested by cost types c < c' are 
larger. If ac' /av > 0 then V will be an increasing function of the value of 
services v, which seems to make intuitive sense. On the other hand, if 
ac' /av < 0 the sign of av1av will depend on the following trade-off: increas-
ing v implies that less types separate, but for those that do the payoff to L 
is larger. If there is a "spike" in the density f (·)at c', then the legislator may 
not prefer a marginal increase in the value of services, since this would imply 
an unacceptably large fraction of cost types switching to the pooled budget 
request at b = v. 
Finally, let 
P(k, v) == J: a;(l3*(c))f(c)dc 
be the ex ante probability that an audit occurs, and 
N(k, v) == J: [1 - a~(l3*(c)) - cx;(l3*(c)]f(c)dc 
be the ex ante probability of no exchange. We can think of these as measures 
of the inefficiency of the agency's and legislature's equilibrium behavior. 
From Proposition 1, 
P(k, v) = J;'(l - exp{ -c!k})f(c)dc + [1 - exp{-c'lk}kl 
(v - c')}J: f(c)dc, (6) 
and 
N(k, v) = 0. (7) 
There are two opposing effects operating on P when the audit cost k in-
creases: for cost types c < c' the probability of an audit is decreasing, but 
since ac'!ak < 0 some cost types are switching from separating at c + k 
to pooling at b = v, and since r(c' + k) < s(v) these types are faced 
with a higher probability of audit. Thus the effect will in general depend on 
the prior f ( ·); a similar conclusion holds for aP/av. Suppose f ( ·) satisfies the 
following inequality: 
J: f(c)dc? f(c') · (v - c'). (8) 
For example, iff(c') is not "too large" or iff (·)is nondecreasing on the in-
terval (v - c', v) (e.g. ,f (·)is uniform), then the above inequality will hold. 
In this instance, then, increasing the audit cost decreases the ex ante prob-
ability of an audit P, while if in addition ac' /av > 0 then increasing the value 
of services increases P. 
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The equilibrium described in Proposition 1 exists whenever k < k*, so 
that it is possible for a subset of cost types to request b = v and leave the 
legislator indifferent between accepting and auditing the budget. Clearly, 
then, this equilibrium will not exist when k > k*, since for these audit costs 
even if all of the cost types request b = v the legislator would be willing to 
accept. 
PROPOSITION 2: If k > k*, then the following constitute sequential equi-
librium strategies: 
~*(c) = v, for all c E [O, v] 
a~(b) = 1, for all b ~ v. 
Thus, if the cost of auditing the agency's budget request is sufficiently 
high, the agency can use its agenda control to extract the total available sur-
plus from the exchange. In this instance 
B(c; k, v) = v, for all c E [O, v ], (9) 
V(k, v) = 0, (10) 
P(k, v) = 0, and (11) 
N(k, v) = 0. (12) 
The effect of changes in the parameters k, v, are obvious. 
As an example, suppose that the cost of services is distributed uniformly 
on the interval (0, c], where c > v. Then the critical values k* and c' take 
on particularly simple forms: k* = v/2, c' = v - 2k. Hence, as long as the 
audit cost is less than half the value of the services, the expected net value 
of the exchange for the legislator will be positive, as cost types 
c E [O, v - 2k] request the amount c + k. 
As noted above there are two possible sources of inefficiency in the in-
teraction between agency and legislator: (1) no exchange and (2) the leg-
islator audits. Propositions 1 and 2 imply that the first type of inefficiency 
does not occur under the closed procedure, while the second type occurs 
only if k < k*. Hence, if k > k*, the equilibrium outcome is efficient. Of 
course in this instance, the equilibrium payoffs are highly skewed; the 
agency receives all of the potential gains from the exchange. Thus if k < k* 
the outcome is somewhat more "equitable," in that both parties receive pos-
itive gains from the exchange, yet the outcome is inefficient; if k > k* the 
outcome is not equitable, yet is efficient. 
Imperfect Auditing 
The basic model outlined above assumes that the auditing technology 
of the legislator is "perfect" in the sense of always determining the true cost 
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of the services. In this section we relax this assumption in the following man-
ner: with probability A. > 0 an audit is "successful," and the true cost is 
vealed, while with probability 1 - A. the audit is "unsuccessful" and reveals 
nothing. As before, given a successful audit, the legislator decides whether 
or not to acquire the agency's services at the true cost c; given an unsuccess-
ful audit, however, L must under the closed procedure make this decision 
based on the original budget request b. The function -y is now defined as 
-y : R x {O, 1} ---i> ~i. 
where 1 is associated with a successful audit. Thus -y(b, 0) is the probability 
that L acquires the services at the budget request b conditional on an un-
successful audit, and -y(c, 1) is the probability L acquires the services given 
a successful audit reveals the true cost to be c. 
The expected utility for the agency is now 
EUA(b, c; ex, -y) == exi(b) · b + ex2(b) · [A. · -y(c, 1) · c 
+ (1-A.) · -y(b, O) · b], 
and that of the legislator is 
EUL(b, ex,-y; µ) == exi(b) · (v - b) + ex2(b) ·[A.· J -y(c, 1) 
· (v - c)µ(c I b)dc + (1 - A.) · -y(b, 0) 
· (v - b) - k] 
Sequential rationality requires that 
{1 if b < v 
-y(b, 0) = 0 if b > v 
and a modification of the proof in Appendix A that ex 1 ( v) + ex2 
(v) = 1 can be used to show that in equilibrium -y(v, 0) = 1. Since 
~(c) ~ v for all c, in equilibrium an audit is always followed by acceptance, 
at either the true cost c or the requested budget b. Thus the expected utility 
for the parties simplifies to 
EUA(b, c; ex) = exi(b) · b + ex2(b) · [A. · c + (1 - A.) · b], 
EUdb, ex; µ) = ex 1(b) · (v - b) + ex2(b) · [v - (A. · Cµ 
+ (1 - A.) . b) - k]. 
Canceling terms, we can characterize the decision calculus for the legislator 
as follows: if b < cµ + k!A., L should accept, while if b > 
cµ + k!A., L should audit. Define 71' = k!A. and let 71'* solve 
J~'c · f(c)dc I J~ f(c)dc = v - 71'. (13) 
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Similarly, for any 'TT < 'TT* define c' as the cost which solves 
G(c', 'TT, v) = Jvc ·f(c)dc!Jv f(c)dc - v +'TT= 0. 
c 1 c' 
(14) 
Clearly the decision criteria for the legislator is a simple transformation of 
that from the earlier model, where the value 'TT = k!A. has replaced the 
value k. This then implies the next result. 
PROPOSITION 3: 
(1) If 'TT > 'TT*, then there exist sequential equilibrium strategies equiv-
alent to those in Proposition 2. 
(2) If 'TT < 'TT* and A. is sufficiently close to 1, then the following con-
stitute sequential equilibrium strategies: 
A*( ) _ {c + 'TT if c E [O, c'] 
I-' c - v if c E (c', v] 
where 
{
1 if b ~ 'TT 
r(b) if b E ('TT, c' + 'TT] 
0 if b E (c' + 'TT, v) 
s(v) if b = v 
1 - cx~(b), 
r(b) = [exp{('TT - b)l'TT} - (1 - A.)]/A. 
s(v) = [r(c' + 'TT) · 'TT - (1 - A.)(v - c')]/A. · (v - c'). 
Hence if A. is close to 1, then the strategies are analogous to those in the orig-
inal model, namely, if 'TT < 'TT* low cost types separate while high cost types 
pool at b = v .10 Further, the separating requests leave the legislator in-
different between accepting and auditing and hence able to randomize. The 
randomization schedule is then chosen to give the agency the incentive to 
request c + 'TT. Thus there is continuity in the equilibrium strategies as A. 
approaches 1, implying that the perfect auditing model is a useful approx-
imation to the situation where A. is "close to" 1. 
Working through the algebra, we see that the equilibrium expected bud-
get for the agency takes on a similar form to that of the basic model as well: 
B(c; k, A., v) = 
{c + exp{ - c/'TT} · 'TT if c E [O, c'] 
c + [exp{-c'/'TT} - (1 - A.)]'TT(v - c)IA.(v - c')ifcE [c', v] (15) 
1°The constraint that A be close to 1 follows from the fact that s(v) must be greater than 
or equal to zero, since for some values of c' and I\ this term might be negative. 
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and the equilibrium expected utility for the legislator is 
V(k, A., v) = s:· (v - c - 7r)f(c)dc. (16) 
In particular, since c' can be written as a function only of Ti kif\ and v, 
there is a simple characterization of the legislator's preferences over audit-
ing technologies (e.g., monitoring, hearings, etc.) generated by the equilib-
rium behavior described in Proposition 3.2. Suppose that Tis a set of au-
diting technologies, where for each t E Tthere is an associated cost k(t) and 
probability of success A.(t). Then the induced preference of L over the set 
Tis defined as follows: a technology tis preferred to t' if k(t)!A.(t) < k(t')! 
11.(t'). An optimal auditing technology for L is then one which solves 
minimize k(t) 
tET }Jt)· 
Thus it is the ratio of cost to probability of success that determines the rel-
ative attractiveness of a particular auditing technology. 
Thus far we have been assuming that the agency is risk neutral in terms 
of preferences over the budget. With imperfect auditing, however, the equi-
librium in Proposition 3.2 presents the agency with two sources of uncer-
tainty; namely, whether or not there will be an audit and whether or not such 
an audit will be successful. Suppose we relax the assumption of the agency's 
risk neutrality by describing A's preferences over the budget by a function 
g : R ~ R, where g(O) = 0 and g' > 0. Thus, the agency might be risk 
averse on low budgets, risk acceptant on high, or whatever. 
PROPOSITION 4: If A. is sufficiently close to 1, then the budget strategies 
in Proposition 3 remain sequential equilibrium budget strategies, re-
gardless of the agency's attitude towards risk. 
The logic of this Proposition is as follows: in Proposition 3.2 the determi-
nants of the agency's equilibrium budget strategy are a function only of the 
legislator's payoffs. Namely, the requested budget for c < c' is such that 
L is indifferent between accepting and auditing, while the critical value c' 
is such that L is indifferent between accepting and auditing a request of 
b = v from cost types c E [c', v]. As long as the relevant value for s(v) 
is nonnegative (which will hold for A. close to 1), there will exist an auditing 
strategy that induces the budget strategy in Proposition 3.2. 11 
11The difficulty in analyzing such a model comes from the fact that the auditing schedule 
which provides the incentive for cost types c < c' to separate does not in general have a closed-
form solution. Define t)i(b) == g'(b)![g(b) - g(b - TI)]; then the appropriate acceptance/ 
auditing schedule is given by r(b) = a · exp{ - f t)i(b)db} - (1 - A.)/A., where a is a con-
stant of integration whose value is derived from the boundary condition r(TI) = 1. 
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The Open Procedure 
Under the closed procedure, the legislator was unable to respond to the 
agency's budget request with a counterproposal for the agency's budget; L 
could only influence the budget following a (successful) audit. As we have 
seen, this has implied a degree of agenda control on the part of the agency 
that has resulted in budgets known to be above the true cost of services. In 
this section we relax this assumption by allowing the legislator to make a 
counterproposal, which the agency can then either accept or reject; if re-
jected then no exchange occurs. As discussed in the introduction, I label this 
the open procedure. In this framework a strategy for the agency will consist 
of a budget request [3 0 : [O, v] ---"'? R, as well as a response a0 : 
[O, v] x R ---"'? [O, 1], where a 0 (c, pl is the probability with which A accepts 
a counterproposal of p by L, given cost of services c. Feasibility requires that 
the agency cannot have a budget less than its cost, so that a 0 
(c, pl = 0 if p < c, and sequential rationality requires that A accept any 
budget greater than or equal to cost, a 0 (c, pl = 1 ifp ~ c. 12 Henceforth, 
we can suppress the function a 0 , since the equilibrium response to any coun-
terproposal is fixed. For the legislator, a strategy will consist of a decision 
for each possible request either to accept, reject, audit, or make a counter-
proposal. Without loss of generality, we can simplify L's strategy by noting 
that rejecting a budget request is equivalent to making a counterproposal 
ofp = 0, while accepting a request of bis akin to making a counterproposal 
of p = b. Thus we can restrict attention to strategies of the form 
(a0 , p0 l, where a 0 : R---"'? [O, 1], Po : R---"'? R, and a 0 (bl gives the probabil-
ity with which L makes a counterproposal following a budget request of 
b, p0 (b l gives the counterproposal, and 1 - a 0 (b l gives the probability of 
audit following a budget request of b. 
For the agency, then, the expected utility from requesting a budget 
of b, given the strategy (a0 , p0 l by the legislator, is EUA 
(b, c; a 0 • p0 l = a 0 (b l · p0 (b l + [1 - a 0 (b)] · c if p0 (b l ~ c and is equal 
to [1 - a 0 (b l] · c, otherwise. As in the basic model the expected utility for 
the legislator from any strategy will in general depend on L's beliefs µcon-
cerning the true cost of services, where now this belief also influences the 
payoff to L's counterproposal as well: 
Jp,(b) EUdb, a 0 • p0 ; µl = a 0 (bl · c [v - p0 (bl]µ(c I bldc 
+[1 - a 0 (bl] · [v - Cµ - k]. 
12In the alternative "variable quality" model in note 6, the agency would accept budgets 
less than cost, but produce lower-quality services. This would alter the equilibrium counter-
proposal by the legislator somewhat, yet not affect the equilibrium budget strategy of the 
agency. 
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Equilibrium Behavior 
Consider the legislator's decision pro15lem. Given beliefs µ, L can solve 
for the optimal counterproposal: 
m:x J: (v - p)µ(c I b)dc; 
denote this value asp (µ ). Sequential rationality requires that p0 (b) 
p (µ ( · I b )), where this price is not a function of the audit cost k . In 
addition we can say something about this counterproposal as a function of 
the support of the beliefµ. Let c Land c H be the lowest and highest cost types 
requesting the budget b, respectively; then clearly p(µ) ~ cH, since pricing 
strictly above cH, is dominated by pricing at cH; similarly p (µ) > 
cL, since otherwise L receives zero utility from the counterproposal. Com-
paring the expected utility generated by p (µ) with (v - cµ - k), the utility 
from auditing, will determine the legislator's optimal decision. 
Now consider the agency's decision problem. Since its final budget will 
be equal either to the true service cost (if audited) or the counterproposal 
by the legislator (if accepted), the budget request by the agency plays a 
purely informational role in the process; the only important feature of the 
request is the information associated with it in terms of which cost types 
make that request. 13 It is clear that an equilibrium budget request strategy 
will never possess a separating region in which [30 reveals the true cost 
of services, as was the case under the closed procedure (when k < 
k*) . Revealing the true cost c would generate an equilibrium counterpro-
posal equal to c, thus providing an incentive for the agency to mimic the bud-
get requests of higher cost types . Another possibility is that [30 is a step func-
tion, so that the budget requests revealed some information. Such "partially 
revealing" strategies are common in these sorts of models (see Crawford and 
Sobel, 1982), and indeed that is the behavior exhibited in a model similar 
to ours in Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) . 
Lemma Al in Appendix A shows formally that (with imperfect audit-
ing) the equilibrium counterproposals associated with all cost types 
c E [O, v] must coincide . 14 Hence, the only equilibria under the open pro-
13This is sometimes referred to as '"costless" signaling, in that the signal (in this case the 
requested budget) does not directly enter into the payoffs of the players. Under the closed pro-
cedure , the selection of a budget request is " costly" in that it might actually be the final budget 
of the agency. 
14Although other equilibria may exist with perfect auditing, the equilibrium outcome is 
essentially unique when A. < 1, and this equilibrium occurs when A. = 1 as well. In math-
ematical parlance the equilibrium correspondence is upper hemicontinuous, rather than con-
tinuous , at A. = 1. 
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cedure will be completely uninformative: all cost types request the same 
budget. The legislator's decision calculus is then predicated simply on the 
prior probability f ( ·). Define p* as the counterproposal which solves 
mPax J: (v - p)f(c)dc; 
p* is thus the equilibrium counterproposal. Clearly p* E (0, v), since at ei-
ther p = 0 or p = v the expected utility for the legislator is zero. Thus 
p* will satisfy the first-order condition 
(v - p)f(p) - J: fk)dc = 0, (17) 
as well as the second-order condition 
(v - p)f'(p) - 2f(p) < 0. (18) 
Define k** as the value of the audit cost k which solves 
rv f P* J 0 (v - c)f(c)dc - k - J 0 (v - p*)f(c)dc = 0 (19) 
Thus, if k < k** and all cost types make the same budget request, the leg-
islator will prefer to audit; if k > k** L will prefer to make a counterpro-
posal equal top*. 
PROPOSITION 5: If k < k**, then the following constitute sequential 
equilibrium strategies: 
~:(c) = v for all c E [O, v ], 
a:(b) = 0 for all b E [O, v]. 
Defining the functions B0 (c; k, v), V0 (k , v), P0 (k, v), and N 0 (k, v) as under 
the closed procedure, we have that for k < k**, 
and 
B0 (c; k, v) = c, for all c E [O, v], (20) 
V0 (k, v) = J: (v - c)f(c)dc - k, (21) 
P0 (k, v) = 1, (22) 
N0 (k, v) = 0. (23) 
PROPOSITION 6: If k > k**, the following constitute sequential equilib-
rium strategies: 
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- v for all c E [O, v ], 
1 for all b E [O, v ], 
{o if b < v p* if b = v . 
For k > k**, then, 
and 
{p* B 0 (c; k, v) = 0 if c ~ p* if c > p* 
V0 (k, v) = J:* (v - p*)f(c)dc, 
0, 
N 0 (k, v) = J;J(c)dc. 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
As an example, suppose thatf (·)is uniform; then k** is v/4, and the optimal 
counterproposal p* is v/2. 
Although other equilibria exist, since the choice of (pooled) budget re-
quest is somewhat arbitrary as is to some extent the out-of-equilibrium re-
sponses by L, the key is that in any equilibrium no new information will be 
transmitted from the agency to the legislator. Thus, in addition to playing 
no substantive role in determining the budget, in equilibrium the budget re-
quest strategy of the agency plays no informational role as well. In partic-
ular, the parameters k and v will not affect the equilibrium budget strategy 
of the agency. Fork < k**, these parameters do not affect the legislator's 
strategy either, while fork > k** L's equilibrium counterproposal will be 
a function of v, but not k. In Appendix A it is shown that ap*!av > 0, so 
that an increase in the legislator's value of services will lead to an increase 
in the equilibrium counterproposal. Hence, the equilibrium budget of the 
agency B0 increases with v for c ~ p*, as does the legislator's expected util-
ity V0 • Whether or not N 0 increases or decreases with v will in general de-
pend on the prior probability f ( ·). 
Notice that if k < k** the equilibrium outcome is inefficient due to the 
legislative auditing; yet an exchange always occurs. If k > k**, on the other 
hand, the legislator never audits, yet if c > p* an exchange does not occur, 
even though an exchange at a price p E [c, v) would be beneficial to both 
parties. The reason they cannot agree to such an exchange, of course, is due 
in part to the informational asymmetry. Yet as the closed procedure shows 
this is not the sole source of the difficulty, since under that procedure an ex-
change would always take place. The problem in the open procedure is pre-
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cisely the inability of the legislator to commit to any counterproposals and 
auditing schedules that are not sequentially rational. In equilibrium the leg-
islator must make the auditing decisions and counterproposals optimally ac-
cording to the information concerning service cost, and in this procedure the 
transmission of any information on the part of the agency will not constitute 
equilibrium behavior. 
As discussed above, the budget request strategies in Propositions 5 and 
6 are equilibrium strategies with imperfect auditing as well. The only dif-
ference in the legislator's strategy will be in the determination of the critical 
value k**. Following an unsuccessful audit, L will select a counterproposal 
equal top*, so that this critical value will be a function of A. (the probability 
of a successful audit) as well as the payoff associated with p*. Similarly, the 
agency's attitudes toward risk play no role in the determination of the equi-
librium behavior. 
A Comparison of Procedures 
We compare the open and closed budgetary procedures (with perfect 
auditing) via the payoffs to the agency and legislator associated with the 
equilibrium behavior described in Propositions 1, 2, 5, and 6. We say 
that the closed procedure Pareto-dominates the open procedure if 
B(c; k, v) ~ B 0 (c; k, v) for all c E [O, v] and V(k, v) ~ V 0 (k, v), with 
strict inequality for either L or for some cost type c; 15 similarly define 
Pareto-domination by the open procedure. An obvious prediction ex ante 
is that B(c; k, v) > B 0 (c; k, v) and V 0 (k, v) > V(k, v), so that the agency 
strictly prefers the closed procedure to the open while the legislator strictly 
prefers the open to the closed. As we shall see, this is not always the case. 
In both procedures there exists a critical value of the audit cost where 
the equilibrium strategies change from one "form" to another. From equa-
tions (1) and (19), it is clear that k*, the critical value under the closed pro-
cedure, is greater thank**, its counterpart under the open procedure. Thus 
we shall compare the equilibria for three different regions of the audit cost: 
k < k**,kE(k**,k*),andk > k*. 
(1) k < k** .B(c;k, v) > c,andB0 (c;k, v) = c,forallcE[O, v); that is, under 
the closed procedure the expected budget for the agency is greater than the 
service cost c, while under the open procedure the expected budget is exactly 
equal to the service cost. Thus, as predicted, the agency strictly prefers the 
closed procedure to the open procedure for all realizations of the service 
cost. Recall from equation (5) that the expected utility for the legislator un-
der the closed procedure is Jg' (v - c - k)f(c)dc. From the definition of 
15In the incomplete information literature, this is known as "interim" domination, as op-
posed to ex ante or ex post domination. Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) argue that this is the 
appropriate concept for situations such as the one studied here. 
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c' in equation (2), however, this is equal to f~ (v - c - k)f(c)dc, which 
is exactly equal to the legislator's expected utility under the open procedure, 
equation (21). Hence, the legislator is actually indifferent between the pro-
cedures if the audit cost k is less thank**. Although this seems paradoxical, 
recall that even though in the closed procedure the legislator does not have 
the option to respond to a request with a counterproposal, L is not com-
pletely at the whim of the agency. The ability to audit, and subsequently to 
impose a budget equal to the service cost, mitigates the ability of the agency 
to extract all of the gains from the exchange. Furthermore, in equilibrium 
the legislator must adopt an interior auditing strategy so as to provide the 
incentive for the agency to reveal information concerning the service cost, 
implying that the budget strategy must be sensitive to the payoff to the leg-
islator. 
Since the agency strictly prefers the closed procedure, we have the fol-
lowing result. 
PROPOSITION 7: If k < k**, the closed procedure Pareto-dominates the 
open procedure. 
With A. less than (but close to) 1, this result will continue to hold, where now 
the legislator will strictly prefer the closed procedure. 
(2) k E (k**, k*). Under the closed procedure, the agency's expected 
budget is still greater than its service cost, while under the open procedure 
the budget is either p* or else no exchange takes place. In this instance it 
is clear that for some service costs (i.e., the lowest) the expected budget may 
actually be greater under the open procedure. For example, letf(·) be uni-
form, v 1, and k E (1/4, 1/2). Then for c 0, B(O; k, v) 
k, while B0 (0; k, v) = p* = 1/2. Thus, depending on the parameters of 
the model and the service cost, the agency might actually prefer the open 
procedure to the closed procedure. In general, however, this preference is 
ambiguous. 
For the legislator it is clear that the open procedure is strictly preferred 
to the closed procedure. To see this, note that from above if under the open 
procedure the legislator audits, L receives exactly the same utility as under 
the closed procedure; yet since k > k**, L prefers to offer a counterpro-
posal rather than audit. Thus the utility for L under the open procedure is 
greater than that under the closed. 
(3) k > k*. Under the closed procedure, the agency's expected budget 
is B(c; k, v) = v, so that regardless of the service cost the agency extracts 
all of the available surplus from the exchange. Since B 0 (c; k, v) 
p* < v or there is no exchange, the agency prefers the closed procedure. 
Likewise, the legislator prefers the open procedure. Hence, in this case nei-
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ther procedure Pareto-dominates the other. What is of interest is to note 
that the trade-off between procedures can be thought of as one between eq-
uity versus efficiency. Recall that the equilibrium outcome under the closed 
rule is efficient; exchange always occurs and auditing never occurs. Yet the 
payoffs are highly skewed; the agency receives all of the surplus. On the 
other hand, the equilibrium outcome under the open rule is inefficient; 
sometimes no exchange occurs, even though one would be beneficial. Yet 
the payoffs are more equitable, in that (in an ex ante sense) both the agency 
and legislator receive some of the gains from exchange. From this it is clear 
that, for relatively high audit cost (i.e., k > k*), the social cost of achieving 
an equitable solution in the presence of the informational asymmetry ana-
lyzed here lies in the inability to realize all of the gains from exchange. 
Conclusion 
This paper has developed and analyzed a simple model of the interac-
tion between a legislature and an agency in the determination of the agency's 
budget when only the agency is aware of the cost of its services. The leg-
islature has the ability to verify the agency's information, but only at a cost. 
Further, the legislature is unable to commit to an auditing schedule ex ante, 
but rather must make its auditing decisions in a sequentially rational fashion. 
The presence of this auditing cost implies that it may be optimal for the leg-
islature to forgo an audit ifthe costs outweigh the benefits. Under the closed 
procedure, in which the legislature is not able to offer a counterproposal to 
the agency, it was shown that, if the audit cost is not too high, the legisla-
ture's optimal auditing schedule is such that the agency has an incentive to 
request lower budgets if the true cost of services is low, thereby signaling 
this cost through its budget request. Further, the agency is unable to extract 
all of the gains from trade by its agenda control. Under the open procedure, 
on the other hand, the agency reveals nothing about its service cost, and the 
legislature proceeds, based on its prior information, with either an audit or 
a counterproposal, depending on the audit cost. A principal result is that, 
for relatively low audit costs, the closed procedure is actually Pareto-
superior to the open procedure, in particular generating a more efficient out-
come. This can be compared with the work of Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) 
on open versus closed rules in Congress, where the relevant committee pos-
sesses an informational advantage vis-a-vis the floor concerning policy out-
comes. Gilligan and Krehbiel show that, in their environment as well, a 
closed rule may be Pareto-preferred to an open rule due to the incentives 
for revealing information inherent in each process. 
As noted in the introduction, the budgetary process in reality resembles 
a multiperiod interaction between the agency and legislature, implying that 
the most fruitful line of future research will be in extending the above analy-
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sis to such a setting. Other relevant extensions would include having the leg-
islature's value of the agency's services be known only to the legislature, thus 
implying a two-sided informational asymmetry. We conjecture that this 
would generate more "separation" on the part of the agency, as well as 
change the nature of the agency's risk attitudes on the equilibrium predic-
tions. Also, by assuming an elastic legislative demand, quantity as well as 
price decisions become relevant; this would also render the model more 
comparable to previous analyses which have as their focus the equilibrium 
quantity of services provided and the associated inefficiency. Another inter-
esting extension would be to assume that the agency has a set of possible 
services, each with a value to the legislature and a cost known only to the 
agency. The issue then is which service (or set of services) will be acquired, 
and at what price. These topics should be addressed in future research. 
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APPENDIX A 
Definition of the Universally Divine Equilibrium Concept 
Most of the extant equilibrium refinements place restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs 
based in part on the equilibrium payoffs associated with each "type" (e.g., cost of services in 
this model) and their subsequent willingness and ability to "defect" from the equilibrium to 
any particular signal. The universal divinity criterion requires that out-of-equilibrium beliefs 
place positive probability only on those cost types which would be "most likely" to deviate from 
the equilibrium and request the (previously) out-of-equilibrium budget. For any b < v, and 
given equilibrium strategies 13*, a* such that 13*- 1(b) <Ji, define 0(c, b; 13*, a*) 
= {EUAl13* (c), c; a*) - c}/(b - c) as the probability of acceptance which makes A with 
cost c indifferent between staying with the equilibrium and requesting b; since b < v the prob-
ability of audit at b is then 1 - 0. Thus in equilibrium it must be that a;(b) ,,; 0 
(c, b) V c. The cost types which are "most likely" to deviate and request b, given 13* and a*, 
are then those that minimize 0(c, b). 
DEFINITION: A universally divine equilibrium consists of strategies 13*, a*, and beliefsµ*, 
such that 
(1) V c E [O, v], 13*(c) maximizes EUA(b, c; a*); 
(2) Vb E R, a*(b) maximizes EUdb, a;µ*); 
(3) if 13*- 1(b) ¥<Ji, thenµ*(· I b) is derived via Bayes's Rule according to 13* and/(-) 
(4) if 13*- 1(b) = <Ji, then µ*(c' I b) > 0 only if c' E arg~in 0(c, b; 13~ a*). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS 1 and 2: Let 13, a, be universally divine equilibrium strategies. 
(1) Ve such that 13(c) < v, a 1(13(c)) > 0. 
Suppose not; define b+ = S~P{13(c) < v : a 1(13(c)) > O}. Then b+ E [k, v), and 
V, < b+, ai113(c)) > 0. Define c = min{c : a 1(13(c)) = O} and select b E (c, min 
{v, c + k}); thus b > b+ and ai(b) = 0. If 13- 1(b) ¥<Ji, then 13- 1(b) C [c, b], so that given 
beliefs µ( · I b), cµ. + k > b. Thus v - b > v - cµ. - k, which implies that in equilibrium 
it must be that a db I 1, contradicting the assumption that b > b +. If 13 - l 
(b) = <Ji, then 0(c, b) = 0 and 0(c, b) = 0 only if c E [c, b), so that again cµ. + k > b 
and ai(b) = a 1(b) = 1, contradicting the definition of b+. QED 
(2) If 13- 1(v) ¥ <ji, then ai(v) + a 2(v) = 1. 
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Clearly ac 1(v) 0 and ah) < 1 implies 13 1(v) <\>, so suppose that aci(v) 
+ a2 (v) < 1 and ai(v) > 0. Define c = ac1(v) · v/(l ac2(v)). By assumption 
c < v. Then 'efc E (c, v), 13(c) # v, since for any b ~ c ai(b) · b + (1 - ai(b)) 
· c ~ c > ai(v) · v + a2 (v) · c. Thus 13(c) < v 'ef c E (c, v), so that ac1(13(c)) > 
0 by result (1) above, which also implies that 13(c) > c as well. Select b arbitrarily close 
to v such that 13- 1(b) # <\>, and define ll(c, b, v) = ac 1(b) · b + c[l - a 1(b) 
ac2(v)] - ac 1(v) · v as the difference in the payoffs from proposing b and v. Then 
13(c) v only if ll(c, b, v) ~ 0 and 13(c) b only if ll(c, b, v) ~ 0. Thus if 
13(c) = v, then there does not exist c' < c such that 13(c') = b, so that 
max{c : 13(c) = v} < min{c : 13(c) = b}. (Al) 
Thus cµlvl < cµfbb and since ai(v) > 0 and v > b, it must be that ac1(b) = 1. But since 
bis chosen arbitrarily close to v, a 1(b) = 1 and ac1(v) < 1 imply that it will not be optimal 
for any c E [O, v) to propose v, which contradicts the assumption that 13- 1(v) # q,. QED 
Thus in any equilibrium it must be that 'ef c E [O, v) aci(13(c)) > 0, and ac2 (13(c)) 
1 - acdl3(c)), so that all cost types have their (equilibrium) request accepted with positive 
probability and never have their services rejected. 
(3) 13 is monotone increasing on [O, v). 
By result (2) we can write the "incentive compatability" condition for an equilibrium as 
ac 1 · (b - c) ~ a; · (b' - c), (A2) 
where ac 1 = acdl3(c)), a; = ac 1(13(c')), b = 13(c), b' = 13(c'). The above equation says that 
no cost type has an incentive to "imitate" another cost type in equilibrium. Let c < 
c'; applying this condition to types c and c' gives 
(b' - c')!(b - c') ~ aifa; ~ (b' - c)!(b - c). 
Canceling terms, we get that 
c' · (b' - b) ~ c · (b' - b), 
so that since c' > cit must be that b' ~ b, proving the claim. 
(A3) 
(A4) 
QED 
Since 13 is monotone increasing, it will have at most a countable number of jump discon-
tinuities, so that we can talk about "separating" or "pooling" segments, where the jumps occur 
at the end of the segments. Further, by the continuity of A's preferences, a cost type at which 
(according to 13) there is a jump must be indifferent between the two possible budget requests. 
Now if a segment CC [O, v) is separating, it must be that 13(c) c + 
k, 'ef c E C, so that L will be indifferent and hence able to ramdomize. But this, along with 
the above results, implies that costs c E (v - k, v) must be pooling at the budget request v. 
If a 1(v) = 1, then all cost types would request v, which will only be an equilibrium if k > k*, 
thus proving Proposition 2. If k < k* and ai(v) E (0, 1), then it must be that Lis indifferent 
between accepting and auditing a request of v. But since 13 is monotone increasing, this implies 
that 13(c) = v 'ef c E (c', v), where c' is defined in equation (2). Thus there will be a jump 
discontinuity in 13 at c = c'. 
The remainder of the proof follows from the application of the Banks-Sobel criterion on 
out-of-equilibrium beliefs to the set of sequential equilibria where c < c'; that is, where there 
is "enough room" for these types to separate (see, e.g., Reinganum and Wilde, 1986). The 
particular audit strategy in Proposition 1 gives cost types c < c' the incentive to request 
13(c) = c + k. To see this, note that since r(b) is differentiable on [k, c' + k] the optimal 
budget request for c E [O, c') on the set of requests [k, c' + k] is characterized by the first-
order condition 
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ao(b - c) + r(b) = 0. 
Since r(b) = exp{(k - b)lk}, this reduces to 
exp{(k - b)!k} · (c - b)!k + exp{(k - b)!k} = 
exp{(k - b)!k} · [(c - b)!k + 1] = 0. 
(AS) 
(A6) 
Since exp{(k - b)!k} > 0 'Vb < oo this equation is solved when (b - c)lk = 1, implying 
that the optimal budget request is b = c + k. Further, since ai(v) is set such that c = c' 
is indifferent between pooling at v and separating at c'(k) = k, no cost c < c' will have 
an incentive to request b v as well. Finally, for all b E (c' + k, v), c' 
mine O(c,b), so that L places probability 1 on any such out-of-equilibrium requests 
coming from c = c'. This then implies that for all such requests a 1(b) = 0. 
This then concludes the proof. QED 
COROLLARY A1: ac'!ak < 0. 
PROOF: From equation (2) we have that 
ac' aG!ak 
ifK = - aG!ac' 
Since aG!ak = 1 and 
aG I." f." cr = )c - c')f(c)dc! [ /1c)dc]2 > 0, 
it follows by equation (A7) that ac'!ak < 0. 
COROLLARY A2: If k < k*, then 
(1) 'V c E [O, v] aB/ak > O; 
(2) 'V c E [O, c') aB!av = O; 
(A7) 
(A8) 
QED 
(3) 'V c E [c', v], if ac'!av > 0 then aB/av § 0 as c § c+, where c+ solves 
ac' 
k · (c - c')l(v - c) - av (v - c' - k) = 0. (A9) 
PROOF: (1) From equation (3) we have that, for c < c', 
aB 
if!Z= exp{ -elk} · (1 + elk) > 0. (AlO) 
For c > c' equation (4) implies 
aB [ ac' ] aK = exp{ -c'!k}(v - c)l(v - c') 1 + c' + alZ · (k - v + c')l(v - c') . (All) 
Since v - c' > k and ac'!ak < 0, the term in brackets in equation (All) is positive, so 
that aB!ak > O. 
(2) From equation (3) it follows that aB!av = 0 for costs c < c'. 
(3) For costs c > c' the sign of aB!av will depend on the sign as well as possibly the mag-
nitude of ac' /av: 
aB { ac' ] av= exp{-c'/k} · fav(k + c' - v) - k · (v - c) + k · (v - c')l(v - cf (A12) 
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Rearranging terms, we get that 
sgn{aB!av} = sgn{~~ (k + c' - v)(v - c) + k(c - c')}. (A13) 
Since v > c' + k and c > c', if ac' /av < 0 then aB/av > 0. Thus if more cost types pool 
at b = v when the value v increases, the expected budget for those that pool at b = v in-
creases. Suppose instead that ae'!av > O; then 
aB , aB(v) 
av l(e I < 0, and ---av> O, 
so that the direction of change in the expected budget will depend on the cost e. The cost e+ 
is then defined as the value such that aB!av = 0, derived from equation (A12). QED 
CoROLLARY A3: If k < k* then 
(1) av1ak < O; 
(2) if ae' 1av > 0 then av1av > 0. 
PROOF: (1) From equation (5) 
av ae' , f,c' Bk= Bk (v - e - k)fie') - 0 fie)de 
so that since ae'!ak < 0 we have that av1ak < 0. 
(2) From equation (5) 
av ae' f,c· 
av= av (v - e' - k)fie') + ofie)de 
so that if ae'!av > 0 then aV!av > 0. 
COROLLARY A4: If k < k* and equation (8) holds, then 
(1) aP1ak < o; 
(2) if ae' 1av > 0 then aP1av > 0. 
PROOF: (1) From equation (6) 
aP Jv Bk= exp{-c'/k}[l - kl(v - e)] · [ c'fie)dc!(v-e') 
- /le')] i - J:·exp{-c!k}(e!k2 )fie)de - exp{-e'!k}[e'!k 
+ 1Jf;_t1c)dc!(v - c'). 
(A14) 
(A15) 
QED 
(A16) 
The last two terms are negative and ae' !ak < 0, so that if equation (8) holds the result follows. 
(2) From equation (6) 
aP Jv av = exp{-e'/k}[l - kl(v - e')] · [ /klde/(v - e') ac' - fie')] av 
+fiv)[l - exp{-e'!k}k!(v - e')] 
+ [exp{-e'/k}/(v - e')2]J:j(c)de. (A17) 
The last two terms are positive, so that if equation (8) holds and ac'!av > 0 then 
aP!av > o. QED 
LEMMA Al: For all equilibria [3 0 , cx0 , p0 under the open procedure with imperfect audit-
ing, Polf3o(e)) = p0 (f30 (e')) Ve, e' E [O, v]. 
PROOF: Let [30 , cx0 , p0 be equilibrium strategies. 
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(1) p0 (f30 (c) ) is monotone increasing in c. 
Let c < c', and define p = p0 (f30 (c)) , p' = p0 (f30 (c' )), r = a 0 (f30 (c)) + (1 - .\) 
[l a 0 (f30 (c) )], r' = a 0 (f30 (c')) + (1 - .\)[1 - a 0 (f30 (c'))]. Incentive compatability requires 
that 
r · Ip - c) ;;,,, r' · (p' - c) 
r' · (p' - c');;,,, r · (p - c' ). 
(A18) 
(A19) 
Since r , r' > 0, dividing through by r!r' implies that p ~ p'. QED 
Thus p0 (f30 ) will be piecewise continuous. As argued in the text, there will not exist any 
"separating regions in [300 so that p0 (f30 ) will not be strictly increasing on any region. Thus p0 (f30 ) 
will constitute a step function, where for all c, c' such that p 7'p' (using the above shorthand) 
there will exist E > 0 such that p - p'I ;;,,, E. 
Recall that p (µ. ) is the optimal counterproposal by L given belief µ.; let supp(µ.) denote 
the support of the distribution µ.. 
(2) V 8 > 0 3 c E supp(µ.) such that p (µ. ) - c < 8. 
If not, then by lowering the counterproposal by an amount less than 8, L retains the same cost 
types accepting the counterproposal while strictly increasing the payoff from the counterpro-
~~- OOD 
Now suppose that 3 c, c' such that p 7' p', and let p < p'. By (1) p' 
p ;;,,, E for some E > 0, and by (2) 3 c E supp(µ.(p)) such that p c < 
8 V 8 > 0. Thus the payoff to c from requesting f30 (c') is r · Ip - c), while that from re-
questing f30 (c' ) is r' · (p - c). Since r, r' E (0, 1] and E > 0, the former is arbitrarily close 
to zero, while the latter is bounded away from zero by the amount r' · E. Thus the original bud-
get request strategy is not an equilibrium. QED 
COROLLARY AS: ap*lav > o. 
PROOF: Implicit differentiation of equation (17) implies that 
ap* av = flp) I [2.f(p) - (v - p)f (p )], (A20) 
which by the second-order condition, equation (18) , is positive. QED 
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